This article aims to explore principles governing mediation both in Ireland and in other jurisdictions, as well as looking at legislation regulating mediation elsewhere. Ireland's impending legislation subsequent to the Mediation Bill, 2017, will be examined.
the decision of whether or not to remain and any pending outcome should belong to the parties; this embodies both voluntariness and self-determination. Yet, in the opinion of the author, it seems the parties may be frowned upon by the court if they are perceived to have not engaged fully in mediation and such is supported by the mediator's statement submitted to the court. This could indeed have repercussions for the parties in truly being allowed to exercise self-determination as well as having a bearing on the element to which the participants fully believe in the neutrality of the mediator when the mediator is being asked to submit such a statement to the court.
A recent case referred to in an Irish Times article saw Judge Hughes giving the relevant parties an ultimatum: mediation or prison (Irish Times, 2016) . In this case a mediator was assigned to tackle a 'sectarian' Islamic dispute in Longford. Here Judge Hughes warned the defendants that he would have no hesitation in handing out prison sentences if animosities continued. Judge Hughes then proceeded to adjourn the case pending the appointment of a mediator. Did Judge Hughes actually compel these parties to engage in mediation? It is the opinion of this author that he did indeed do so. However, what is important to emphasise at this point is the extent of such compelling. Hanks (2012, p.930) pointed out a key distinction with regard to voluntariness into and within the process. That is a crucial distinction to bear in mind. Allen (2011, p. 2) also points to the fact that entry into mediation does not compel the parties to settle: they can leave voluntarily without adverse consequences and revert to their litigated case at any time. This is where the true meaning of "voluntariness" arises and is important (Allen, 2011, p.2) . But is Head 17(iv) supporting the true meaning of voluntariness? The MII Code of Ethics and Practice (Mediation Institute of Ireland, nos. 61, 62) also refers to voluntary participation and outlines also that any party, including the mediator, may leave the process at any time without having to give reasons.
While we saw Judge Hughes compelling the parties to engage in mediation, he will have no input in the process or the outcome; voluntariness will return to and remain with the parties once engaged in the process. One must ask does this strike a fair balance or is any impingement on voluntariness a step toward stripping away the fundamental nature of the principle? There are however very strong arguments in other jurisdictions, in Italy, for example, (examined below) where mandatory mediation in the sense of compelling parties to engage in it, has worked. I think a danger lies where an obligation or discretion in some cases, as seen with the judiciary above, could ultimately open the door for some type of mandatory mediation and this could impinge upon one of the fundamental principles of mediation i.e. voluntariness. Heads 14 and 15 of the 2017 Bill also place an obligation on solicitors and barristers to provide information and advice on mediation. A written statement must then be submitted to the court when making an application to commence civil proceedings stating that mediation has been considered; where such a statement is not included, the court may adjourn proceedings until such a statement is provided.
An Analysis of the Voluntary Nature of Mediation in two Other Jurisdictions
England Hanks (2012, p.933) held that it did not have the power to compel parties to mediate against their will as this would constitute a breach of Article 6 ECHR, but nevertheless the English courts go on to financially punish those parties who have refused to engage in mediation, as illustrated in the cases referenced above. The Civil Procedure Rules (CPR) which came into effect in 1999 place a strong emphasis on pre-action procedures; rule 44.3(5) thereof allows a court to make such adverse cost orders against a party who has refused to engage in pre-action protocols (Hanks, 2012, p.940) ; note that this is similar to Ireland's Legal Services Regulation Act, 2015, section 169(1)(g). Prince (2009) pointed to the introduction of a central telephone mediation helpline by the government resulting in what she describes as a loss of ownership by the court who had previously referred cases to their local mediation scheme (Hanks, 2012 , p.940 citing Prince, 2009 . She notes that "In the future, the benefits of mediation can only be further appreciated if public awareness is raised; mediation is integrated into the legal system; and furthermore, the complex and challenging issues which are raised in order to do this are fully addressed" (Hanks, 2012, pp.940-941) .
Italy
Italy seems to have embraced mandatory mediation as a means of improving access to civil justice (Hanks, 2012, p.936) . A delay of access of several years has had adverse consequences for the 
Impartiality/Neutrality
Head 6(9) of Ireland's 2017 Bill states that it is for the parties involved in mediation to determine the outcome of the process; while this section specifically relates to the principle of self-determination, it ties in with impartiality/neutrality; crucial to the parties determining the outcome is the mediator remaining impartial to the parties and neutral to the process. Moore (2003) views impartiality as referring "to the absence of bias or preference in favour of one or more negotiators, their interests, or the specific solutions that they are advocating" (p.53). He refers to neutrality as referring "to the relationship or behaviours between intervenor and disputants" (ibid.). The MII Code is on par with this view, stating that the mediator must not take sides (Code of Ethics and Practice no. 56). It is also suggested by the MII code that if the mediator feels that impartiality cannot be maintained, the mediation process should be terminated (Mediation Institute of Ireland, no. 56). Bradley (2016, p.1) submits that while on paper, the fundamental principle of neutrality is a sound one, in that as a voluntary process the very success of mediation depends on all the parties feeling comfortable that the mediator is there to facilitate the process in a fair impartial way, in practice, she says that the pursuit of neutrality throws up a whole raft of issues.
Imagine a mediator so neutral that they give no support to either party (Bradley 2016, p.1) . Is this what participants embroiled in conflict want? Mayer (2004, p.17) suggests not; they want assistance, advocacy, advice, power, resources, connections or wisdom. Whilst a mediator will announce that they intend to act in an impartial manner, it will undoubtedly be very hard to maintain this stance. Bradley (2016, p.1) suggests the reason for this is that as humans, mediators cannot completely detach from any views or feelings pertaining to the dispute or parties. A neutral mediator has been described by Fisher as 'a eunuch from Mars, totally powerless' (Hung, 2002, p Cloke (2001) holds that "there is no such thing as genuine neutrality when it comes to conflict; everyone has had conflict experiences that have shifted his or her perceptions, attitudes, and expectations, and it is precisely these expectations that give us the ability to empathise with the experiences of others" (p.12). Real fairness, Cloke submits, comes from using the past to gain an open, honest, humble perspective on the present (ibid.). Steier (1991) advocates self-reflexivity which is the 'turning back of one's experiences upon oneself and being conscious of ourselves as we see ourselves' (pp.2-5). Selfreflexivity recognises that our practices are culturally specific, not neutral, and requires the mediator to be 'explicit about the operation of power' (Ribbens, 1989, p.162) and to be mindful of their powerful position in the mediation process (Bagshaw, 2015, p.7) . The reflexive mediator assumes a non-hierarchical position and works collaboratively with clients in a more collegial, partnership role (ibid.).
Bagshaw (ibid.) submits that dominant Western models of mediation presuppose that there is a roughly equal balance of power between the parties, and the mediator will work to balance any slight difference, but as outlined by Focault there are dominant voices and those which are subordinated and silenced in many instances (2015, p.9) . For mediation outcomes to be fair and just, any issue of a use and abuse of power must be addressed (Bagshaw, 2015, p.9) . Bagshaw further submits that it is impossible for mediators to be value-free, maintaining that the human rights of oppressed individuals and groups in a society can be easily ignored by mediators in the guise of neutrality (ibid., p.13). Whilst Bagshaw's article "…when the going gets tough" they definitely veered toward the latter approach (Bradley, 2016, pp.1-2) .
Bradley suggests that when adopting an evaluative approach, a mediator will need to drop hints about their line of thinking (ibid. p.1). In fact, she submits that the reality testing, challenging and coaching which are required to reach settlement almost always require the mediator to take and express a view or feeling in a way which supports one or more parties. Striking a balance here is an enormous skill for a mediator to acquire. Bradley submits that the parties must perceive a necessary degree of fairness (ibid., p.2).
Paramount for any mediator is to outline at the beginning of a process that the mediator may meet with or telephone the parties separately, so that they are both aware of the possibility of separate interaction. The MII's Code of Ethics and Practice no.57 states that nothing shall prevent the mediator from talking to, phoning, communicating with or meeting one Party separately, with or without the knowledge of the other Party, provided it has been explained to the Parties that this might happen and that impartiality and neutrality are maintained. "Balanced" mediation will require a responsibility to protect both parties. (Bailey, 2014 , p.1 citing Benjamin, 1998 . If mediators are too tightly bound by procedural requirements for a scrupulously neutral process they will lose the ability to fashion a process that truly addresses the needs of clients (Taylor, 1997, p.222) . Equally, if mediators start muscling clients into positions they do not wish to take or prevent them from making agreements they freely chose, it may no longer be a neutral process at all (ibid.). The enormous skill of striking a balance, referred to above, is again something that Taylor points to in outlining that the skill lies in knowing when and how to intervene without compromising the entire process; such a skill is the "hallmark of a reflective and competent practitioner" (ibid.). Crucial to the principles of voluntariness, impartiality and selfdetermination is that both sides have the right to opt out of any outcome they perceive as being unfair.
